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1 Introduction
Population aging, i. e., the shift in the distribution of a country’s population towards older
ages, is one of the most important demographic phenomena of our time. It will neither
be confined to the West nor to industrialized economies. Table 1 presents actual data
and forecasts of the old-age dependency ratio for selected countries and regions based on
data from the United Nations.1 Roughly speaking, between 2005 and 2050 this ratio is
forecasted to double in Europe and Northern America. In Japan, India, Brazil, and Chile
its estimated increase is even greater.
Table 1: Old-Age Dependency Ratios in Selected Countries and Regions.
Year Europe Northern Japan India Brazil Chile
America
2005 23 19 30 7 9 12
2050 47 36 74 20 36 36
Population aging is likely to alter the distribution of preferences and the support for
different types of government spending, thereby affecting economic growth. A typical
concern expressed in the public debate is that rising old-age dependency ratios lead to
a growing overall tax burden, and thus slow down economic growth. Moreover, it is
feared that increased spending on the elderly, e. g., on health and care service, crowds out
public investment spending and has negative effects on economic growth. Recent evidence
suggests that the concerns with respect to public spending are partly justified. In the
United States, for example, the allocation of expenditure is highly skewed towards older
members (see, e. g., Rogers et al., 2000; Iqbal and Turnovsky, 2008) and since 1959 public
spending on the elderly has grown much faster than other categories of public expenditure
(Mulligan and Sala-´ı-Martin, 1999). Poterba (1997) finds that a similar pattern holds in
other OECD countries. Moreover, U.S. federal public spending on infrastructure declined
from 5% to 2.5% of GDP over the time period from 1960 to the mid-1990’s. However, total
productive government spending on infrastructure, educational institutions, and R&D
remained stable at 10% of GDP over the same time period (CBO, 1998).
1Table 1 is based on the data that appear as the ‘medium variant’ prediction in United Nations (2008).
The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 65 or over to the population aged 15−64.
The ratio is stated as the number of dependents per 100 persons of working age (15− 64).
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This paper introduces a democratic voting process into a simple two-period overlapping
generations model with endogenous growth a` la Barro (1990) in order to analyze how
population aging, i. e., an increase in the old-age dependency ratio, endogenously changes
the composition of government spending and long-term economic growth.
We focus on two public spending categories: productive government expenditure (e. g., on
infrastructure, education, or law and order) that increases private production possibilities
and (unproductive) public consumption spending that only benefits the elderly (e. g., on
health and care services or public infrastructure for the elderly). To finance its expenditure
the government levies a uniform, proportional tax on labor and capital income. We solve
for the politico-economic equilibrium in which government policy is set each period through
voting by rational, forward-looking agents. In particular, voters take into account that
current policy choices influence the evolution of the economy and future policies.
As government policy choices are of differing concern to the young and the old, they dis-
agree on which policy mix they prefer to be implemented. We model the resolution of the
resulting political conflict under the assumption of probabilistic voting. In contrast to the
median voter model, the probabilistic voting model assures that policy proposals repre-
sent the interests of both groups of society, reflecting the political process in representative
democracies more realistically.
Since elections take place each period, policy makers cannot commit to future policy
choices. Therefore, voters have to form expectations about future policy outcomes. We
focus on Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., equilibria in which the policy choices expected for
a certain period depend only on the value of the fundamental state variable at that time.2
Under standard functional form assumptions, we are able to determine the politico-
economic equilibrium and the implications of population aging in closed form. (This is in
contrast to most of the literature that has to resort to numerical methods to characterize
the politico-economic equilibrium. When we relax the functional form assumptions, and
thus have to use numerical examples, the qualitative results turn out to be robust.)
We find that in the politico-economic equilibrium both types of government expenditure
are chosen as constant shares of output and all variables in per capita terms grow at
the same constant rate. The equilibrium share of output devoted to productive purposes
corresponds to the exogenous output elasticity of productive public expenditure. In other
words, it does not depend on preferences or demographic parameters, and thus is not
affected by any form of population aging. By contrast, the equilibrium share of public
spending on the elderly balances the interests of the old who support this type of spending
2For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibria in the context of endogenous dynamic fiscal policy see,
for instance, Krusell et al. (1997).
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as long as its benefits outweigh its tax costs and those of the young taxpayers who as net
contributors oppose this form of public spending.
Voters internalize only those effects of government policy that materialize during their life-
times; negative consequences borne by subsequent cohorts (due to higher overall taxes and
lower capital accumulation) are not taken into account. By contrast, a benevolent planner
with “dynastic” welfare weights (i. e., with welfare weights reflecting the households’ dis-
count factor and cohort sizes) also considers the effects on future households. Therefore,
the share of public consumption spending on the elderly implemented by such a planner
tends to be smaller than the corresponding share in the politico-economic equilibrium.
Population aging in our framework occurs either due to a decline in fertility, which in
turn lowers the population growth rate, or due to an increase in life expectancy. Both
phenomena increase the old-age dependency ratio and the relative weight that the political
process attaches to the interests of the old relative to the young voters. The model
predicts an increase in the old-age dependency ratio to be associated with (i) higher
public consumption spending on the elderly (as a share of output), (ii) unchanged public
productive expenditure (as a share of output), and (iii) a higher distortionary income tax
rate. The latter has a negative effect on the economy’s growth rate of per capita variables.
However, population aging not only affects economic growth indirectly via the composition
and financing of government spending, but also has a direct effect on economic growth.
For a given policy mix, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio accelerates economic
growth. If the increase in the old-age dependency ratio follows a slowdown in the popula-
tion growth rate this result is due to reduced capital dilution. In the case of a higher life
expectancy the positive growth effect results from an increase in precautionary savings.
The same channels are at work in any AK-type OLG growth model. In this paper, we
evaluate whether a positive growth bias of population aging persists when an increasing
fraction of elderly prefers higher public consumption spending and less economic growth.
We find that in both scenarios the direct effect dominates the indirect effect such that
population aging overall increases the economy’s growth rate of per capita variables.
This paper relates and contributes to at least two strands of the literature. First, it makes
a contribution to the recent politico-economic literature on dynamic fiscal policy where
rational, forward-looking agents vote repeatedly on the level and financing of different
types of government spending. Recent contributions that analyze how population aging
endogenously affects government spending include Bassetto (2008), Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt (2008), and Song et al. (2009).3 Hitherto, this literature has not considered a
3See, e. g., Hassler et al. (2007, 2005) or Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (1999) for insights about the politico-
economic determination of taxes, transfers, and/or public consumption spending in environments where
agents are heterogeneous in human capital and earnings. However, these papers do not consider the role
of population aging.
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public policy mix that involves productive government expenditure and public consump-
tion spending that only benefits the elderly. Moreover, the above mentioned papers do
not consider an endogenous economic growth framework such that they cannot study the
effect of demographic change on long-term economic growth. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the only exception is Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) who quantitatively analyze
the effect of population aging on public spending for education, public transfers between
workers and retirees, and endogenous productivity growth in a three-period overlapping
generations model with human and physical capital accumulation. In their framework,
population aging induces a reallocation of public resources from education spending to
retirement benefits, which has a negative growth effect. Similar to our results, they also
find that reduced capital dilution more than outweighs this effect and that the long-term
growth rate overall increases.
Second, this paper complements the theoretical literature on the causal effect of population
aging on long-term economic growth in models with overlapping generations and endoge-
nous economic growth. Most contributions in this strand of the literature find this effect
to be positive.4 It results, for instance, from the following channels: (i) reduced capital
dilution due to a slowdown in population growth (see, e. g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt,
2007), (ii) changes in individual saving behavior because of a longer expected lifetime (see,
e. g., Futagami and Nakajima, 2001), (iii) more investment in innovations that increase
labor productivity because a smaller labor force makes the input factor labor more expen-
sive (see, e. g., Irmen and Heer, 2008), (iv) more private investments into new technologies
as they are more likely to pay off when the individual time horizon expands (see, e. g.,
Prettner, 2009). In the present paper, either channel (i) or (ii) is at work. Additionally,
a new channel operates in the opposite direction: population aging by shifting political
power from the young to the old leads to an increased demand for public consumption
spending and a slowdown of economic growth.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
characterizes the allocation conditional on policy. Section 3 describes the political decision-
making process and establishes the politico-economic equilibrium. The allocation chosen
by a Ramsey planner, who cares about all future generations, is studied in Section 4.
Section 5 analyzes how an increase in the old-age dependency ratio affects the composition
of government expenditure and economic growth in the politico-economic equilibrium.
While Section 5.1 considers a decline in the population growth rate, Section 5.2 studies
4By contrast, Irmen (2009) finds that in the presence of capital-saving technical change population
aging does not affect the economy’s steady-state growth rate.
5There are a few papers (see, e. g., Yakita, 2008; Dioikitopoulos, 2009) that examine the effect of popu-
lation aging on the growth-maximizing composition of government expenditure. However, in these papers
policy is not determined endogenously via a political process and thus does not reflect the distribution of
preferences.
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the case where the old-age dependency ratio increases because of a higher life expectancy.
Section 6 discusses and extends the analysis in two directions. First, in Section 6.1 the
Markov perfect equilibrium of Section 3 is compared to two other voting equilibria. Second,
numerical examples in Section 6.2 suggest that our main findings are robust to the use
of two alternative utility functions. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The Economic Environment
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which non-altruistic agents live for two
periods: a working period and a retirement period.6 Individual labor supply when young
is inelastic and normalized to one. The size of generation t is denoted by Lt and grows at
the exogenous rate n > (−1). The population at any t thus consists of Lt young and Lt−1
old individuals.7 Note that n corresponds to the growth rate of the total population and
determines the old-age dependency ratio defined as Lt−1/Lt = (1 + n)−1. The economy
starts at time 0 with L−1 = 1.
2.1 Preferences
In the economy at each t there is one private good and one public (consumption) good. The
private good delivers utility to the agents when young and when old, whereas the public
consumption good only benefits the old agents. For concreteness, one may think of this
public good involving publicly-provided health and care services or public infrastructure
for the elderly.
The preferences of an individual born at t are described by the following log-linear utility
function8
ln cyt + β
(
ln cot+1 + b ln h˜t+1
)
, (2.1)
6This can be considered the most conservative scenario. A setup with agents that are altruistic towards
future generations would represent an intermediate case between the framework presented in this section
and the Ramsey planner of Section 4. Thus, it can be expected that altruistic agents would vote for a lower
share of public consumption spending and a higher equilibrium growth rate than in the politico-economic
equilibrium of Proposition 1.
7In the following sections we focus on a deterministic life time. Only in Section 5.2 we reinterpret and
extend the setup of Section 2 to incorporate an uncertain life time and the concept of life expectancy.
8The choice of logarithmic utility guarantees analytical tractability, but does not affect the qualitative
findings. We return to this point in Section 6.2, where the results from the logarithmic utility case are
compared to those of (i) a utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution different
from unity and (ii) non-separable preferences.
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where cyt and c
o
t+1 are consumption of the private good of a member of generation t when
young and old, respectively, and h˜t+1 is the level of provision of the public good per old
agent at t+1, i. e., h˜t+1 ≡ Ht+1/Lt, where Ht+1 denotes aggregate spending on the public
consumption good at t + 1. The fact that h˜t+1 and not Ht+1 enters the utility function
implies that there is congestion in the public consumption good.9 Moreover, β ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the discount factor and b > 0 measures the weight an old agent assigns to the
public relative to the private consumption good.
2.2 Technology
At each t, the private good is produced by competitive firms operating a technology
that uses capital Kt procured by the old, labor Lt supplied by the young, as well as a
productivity-enhancing input Gt provided by the government. One may think of G as
government expenditure on infrastructure, education, or law and order. More specifically,
we assume that total output of the private good at t, Yt, is manufactured according to
Yt = AKαt (gtLt)
1−α , 0 < α < 1, (2.2)
where A > 0 denotes the time-invariant total factor productivity and gt ≡ Gt/Lt is the
productive public input per worker at t. Thus, there is also congestion in the productive
public input.10 Given the length of the considered period (one generation) it is assumed
that capital fully depreciates after each use.
Let yt ≡ Yt/Lt and kt ≡ Kt/Lt denote output and capital per worker, respectively. Then,
we obtain output per worker from (2.2) as
yt = Akαt g
1−α
t . (2.3)
The initial capital stock per worker is given by k0 > 0.
Note that the technology displays diminishing returns in private capital, but constant
returns to scale in private capital and the productive public input. Thus, if g rises with k
9In other words, this type of government activity has the character of a utility-enhancing transfer to
the old that is not excludable, but rival. Alternatively, we could assume that public consumption spending
enters the utility function as a pure public good. The main difference of this modeling approach concerns
the long-term effect of population aging on the level of services derived by each old agent from public
consumption spending. See Section 5.1, for a more detailed discussion.
10The congestion specification assures the existence of a politico-economic equilibrium and a balanced
growth path. By contrast, if G were a pure public good, then the interest rate in the politico-economic
equilibrium would depend on the aggregate labor supply (see, e. g., Irmen and Kuehnel, 2009, Section 3.1,
for a discussion), which in our framework grows over time. However, for an endogenous balanced growth
path to exist, the equilibrium interest rate has to be constant. The Barro (1990) literature that uses a
pure public good specification avoids this problem by assuming a stationary population.
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the diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital do not set in. For this reason, the
economy will exhibit endogenous steady-state growth.
At any time t, the private good can either be consumed, saved as capital for the next
period, or be converted one-to-one into units of Ht and Gt. We take the private good
produced at each period t as the numeraire.
2.3 Government Policy
In each period, the government raises tax revenues and uses the proceeds to purchase
private consumption goods to be converted into the public consumption good and the
public productive input. Specifically, the government at each t levies a proportional tax
τt ∈ [0, 1] on labor income of the young and capital income of the old. The government
cannot issue age-dependent taxes and the government’s budget is assumed to balance in
each period t, i. e., Gt +Ht = τt (wtLt +RtKt), where wt is the pre-tax wage rate at time
t and Rt is the rental rate of capital at time t.
Then, the government’s budget constraint in per worker terms is given by
gt + ht = τt (wt +Rtkt) , (2.4)
where ht ≡ Ht/Lt = h˜t/(1 + n) is the level of the public consumption good per worker
at t. As ht is proportional to h˜t and n is exogenous, we focus - for notational simplicity -
on the policy mix (gt, ht).
Then, a feasible government policy at t is a vector (gt, ht) ∈ R2+ such that (2.4) holds and
τt ∈ [0, 1].
2.4 Timing
Within each period t the timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of the period,
after a new generation of young people has been born, all individuals (the young and the
old) democratically elect a political candidate who chooses current policy. When deciding
which candidate to support, voters anticipate how each candidate’s policy platform would
affect subsequent economic and political decisions. Then, firms hire workers and rent
capital to produce. The policy vector and the resulting income tax rate together with the
wage rate and the rental rate of capital determine the consumption of the old and the
disposable income of the young. The young then choose how much to consume and how
much to save as capital for the next period. Finally, the old generation dies, while the
young generation ages and becomes old in the next period.
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In order to solve for the equilibrium we proceed by backward induction. We start in Sec-
tion 2.5 by analyzing the economic choices of households and firms subject to exogenously
given (prices and) government policy. We refer to the allocation that results at time t
for a given policy mix as the economic equilibrium. Section 3 then considers the political
determination of policy.
2.5 Economic Equilibrium
In an economic equilibrium, each household maximizes her lifetime utility given by (2.1)
taking factor prices and the benefits from the public consumption good as given. Each
individual that is born at time t ≥ 0 faces the per-period budget constraints cyt + st ≤
(1− τt)wt and cot+1 ≤ st (1− τt+1)Rt+1, where st denotes savings at t.
The optimal choices of a member of cohort t are then given by
cyt =
1
1 + β
(1− τt)wt, (2.5)
cot+1 =
β
1 + β
(1− τt)wt (1− τt+1)Rt+1, (2.6)
st =
β
1 + β
(1− τt)wt. (2.7)
Note that optimal saving of a young agent at t, given by (2.7), does neither depend on
the population growth rate nor on future fiscal policy.11
Moreover, in an economic equilibrium each firm maximizes its profits taking factor prices
and the level of provision of the productive public input as given. Thus, the firms’ profit
maximization problem determines the rental rate of capital and the pre-tax wage rate as
Rt = α
yt
kt
and wt = (1− α) yt, (2.8)
respectively, where yt is given by (2.3). Due to constant returns to scale in private inputs
the firm sector makes zero profits, i. e., Yt = wtLt + RtKt. This in turn implies that the
government budget constraint (2.4) may be written as
gt + ht = τtyt. (2.9)
For the capital market to clear it has to hold at all t that
Kt+1 = stLt, (2.10)
i. e., the aggregate capital stock in period t+1 corresponds to aggregate saving in period t.
11The latter independence is a direct consequence of the logarithmic utility and greatly simplifies the
analysis. We relax this restriction in the numerical sensitivity analysis of Section 6.2.
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Combining conditions (2.5) - (2.10), the equilibrium allocation in t can be expressed in
terms of government policy and the capital stock per worker
cyt =
1− α
1 + β
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
, (2.11)
cot = α(1 + n)
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
, (2.12)
kt+1 =
st
1 + n
=
B˜
1 + n
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
) ≡ pik(gt, ht, kt), (2.13)
where B˜ ≡ β (1− α) /(1 + β).12
The function pik(·) is the economic equilibrium condition that describes how young agents
optimally choose their savings and thus determine the next period’s capital stock per
worker for given gt, ht, and kt. Equation (2.13) also reveals how the composition and
financing of government spending affects capital accumulation. First, the income tax
financing of both types of public expenditure has a negative effect on the accumulation of
capital (negative terms in brackets). Second, gt has an additional positive effect on the
accumulation of capital by raising the productivity of private capital.
In an economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of a young and an old agent alive at t,
respectively, can be expressed as functions of government policy and the capital stock per
worker:
UYt = ln c
y
t + β
(
ln cot+1 + b ln h˜t+1
)
= ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+β ln
(
Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1
)
+ βb lnht+1 + t.i.p., (2.14)
UOt = ln c
o
t + b ln h˜t = ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ b lnht + t.i.p., (2.15)
s.t. kt+1 = pik(gt, ht, kt). Here, t.i.p. denotes terms independent of the policy choice.
3 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In the politico-economic equilibrium, the government policy mix (gt, ht) is chosen through
voting at the beginning of each period t. Electoral competition is modeled under the
assumption of probabilistic voting. As elections take place each period, policy makers
cannot commit to future policy choices. Therefore, voters have to form expectations
about future policy outcomes. In order to limit the set of potential equilibria, we restrict
attention to Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., equilibria in which the policy choices expected
for a certain period depend only on the value of the fundamental state variables expected
12Note that the above equilibrium conditions imply that the market for the private good clears at all t,
i. e., Ltc
y
t + Lt−1c
o
t +Kt+1 +Gt +Ht = Yt.
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at that time, and not on the past history of policies or artificial state variables sustaining
trigger strategy equilibria. In the present setup, the only state variable is the level of the
private capital stock per worker; it affects future wages and returns, and therefore income
of future voters.13
3.1 Probabilistic Voting
The political process is represented via a two-candidate probabilistic voting model. In this
model agents cast their votes on one of two candidates, who maximize their probability
of becoming elected. Voters support a candidate not only for her policy platform, but
also for other characteristics like “ideology” that are orthogonal to the fundamental policy
dimensions of interest. The evaluation of these features differs across voters and is subject
to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have chosen their platforms.14
In a probabilistic-voting Nash equilibrium, two candidates maximizing their respective vote
shares both propose the same policy platform and each of them has a 50 % probability of
winning. The proposed policy platform maximizes a “political objective function” which
is a weighted average utility of all voters, with the weights reflecting the group size and
the sensitivity of voting behavior to policy changes. Groups that have a low concern for
the orthogonal policy dimension have more political influence since they are more likely to
alter their support in response to small changes in the proposed platform. In other words,
these groups of “swing voters” are more attractive to power-seeking candidates and exert a
stronger influence on the equilibrium policy outcome. Formalizing the foregoing discussion,
we assume that the “political” aggregation of different preferences is summarized by the
following political objective function
Ut = (1 + n)UYt + ωU
O
t , (3.1)
where UYt and U
O
t are given by (2.14) and (2.15), respectively, ω > 0 represents the per-
capita political weight of the old relative to the young, and (1 + n) the relative group
size of the young compared to the old. Thus, the political objective function (3.1) to be
maximized in the political process attaches a positive weight to the welfare of the elderly,
even if the median voter is a young agent. This appears to be a realistic implication. In
fact, it is often argued that the old are more policy-focused, i. e., care less about ideology
and have more swing voters, and thus even exert a stronger political influence per capita
13Note that the population growth rate n as well as life expectancy in Section 5.2, i. e., the variables that
determine the old-age dependency ratio, will affect the actual policy choice. However, in their decision-
making process all agents treat these variables as exogenous.
14For a more detailed discussion of the probabilistic voting model, see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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than the young (see e. g., Rhodebeck (1993, p.357), Dixit and Londregan (1996, p.1144)
or Grossman and Helpman (1998, p.1309)). This case would correspond to an ω > 1.
Using the expressions for UYt and U
O
t , the political objective function obtains as
U (gt, ht, kt, gt+1, ht+1, kt+1) = (1 + n+ ω) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ ωb lnht
+ (1 + n)β ln
(
Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1
)
+ (1 + n)βb lnht+1
subject to kt+1 = pik(gt, ht, kt).
3.2 Definition of the Politico-Economic Equilibrium
As mentioned above, we look for Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., for equilibria in which the
policy choices are functions only of the level of private capital per worker in the economy.
The dynamic aspect of the voting game stems from the fact that current policy affects
capital accumulation, and thus income and the strategic position of the currently young
in the next period. Agents are assumed to be fully forward-looking. Thus, when voting
over today’s policy, young agents correctly anticipate how future policy will depend on
current policy via the state of the economy.
Definition 1 The Politico-Economic Equilibrium is defined as a pair of functions〈
pig, pih
〉
, where pig and pih are public policy rules, gt = pig (kt) and ht = pih (kt), such that
the following functional equation holds:〈
pig (kt) , pih (kt)
〉
= arg max{gt,ht} U (gt, ht, kt, gt+1, ht+1, kt+1), subject to
kt given,
kt+1 = pik (gt,ht, kt) ,
gt+1 = pig (kt+1) = pig
(
pik (gt,ht, kt)
)
,
ht+1 = pih (kt+1) = pih
(
pik (gt,ht, kt)
)
.
The equilibrium condition requires the political mechanism in t to choose gt and ht to
maximize the political objective function U , for a given kt, taking into account that future
government policies, gt+1 and ht+1, depend on the current policy mix (gt, ht) via the state
of economy, kt+1, as described by the economic equilibrium decision rule pik. Moreover, the
above definition of the politico-economic equilibrium has the usual fixed point structure
induced by a rational expectations equilibrium: the anticipated policy functions coincide
with the optimal ones. In other words, suppose that agents believe future government
policy to be set according to gt+1 = pig (kt+1) and ht+1 = pih (kt+1). Then, we require that
the same functions gt = pig (kt) and ht = pih (kt) define optimal spending today.
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3.3 Solving for the Politico-Economic Equilibrium
To solve for the politico-economic equilibrium we need to find two functions pig and pih
satisfying Definition 1. Guided by the fact that government expenditure is financed by a
proportional tax on income, we conjecture that pig and pih are linear functions in the capital
stock. Specifically, we make the following guess for future policy variables: pig (kt+1) =
ηgkt+1 and pih (kt+1) = ηhkt+1, with some yet undetermined coefficients ηg and ηh.15 We
derive the equilibrium choice of government policy in period t under this conjecture and
show that the spending shares in t are indeed linear in the capital stock, thereby verifying
the conjecture.
First of all, note that with this guess the production function (2.3) at t+ 1 becomes linear
in the capital stock yt+1 = A (ηg)
1−α kt+1 and we can write Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1 =(
A(ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh) kt+1.
Using these results and omitting terms independent of the policy choice, the program
characterizing equilibrium policy choices in period t can be expressed as
max
{gt,ht}
U¯(gt, ht, kt) s.t. kt given, where
U¯(gt, ht, kt) ≡ [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω] ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ ωb lnht.
(3.2)
After some algebra, the first-order conditions of the program (3.2) with respect to gt and
ht yield
gt = (1− α)yt and ht = αωb(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)yt, (3.3)
where yt = A (ηg)
1−α kt. (3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) verify the tentative guess as a fixed point of the functional equa-
tion of Definition 1 if ηg = (A (1− α))1/α and
ηh = αωb [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]−1A1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α, which allow us to es-
tablish the following proposition.
15Note that the above decision problem is a stationary Markov decision problem because the problem
facing voters looks the same (contingent on the state) at each t. Moreover, note that guessing a policy
function that does not depend on time per se is not the same as imposing ex-ante that the expenditure
has to be a constant fraction of the capital stock. For details on this see Section 6.1.1.
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Proposition 1 (Politico-Economic Equilibrium)
The politico-economic equilibrium is characterized as follows:
pig (kt) = (1− α) yt and pih (kt) = τPh yt,
with yt = A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα kt
and α > τPh ≡ αωb [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]−1 > 0 such that 0 < τ = 1 − α +
τPh < 1 for all t.
Moreover, the equilibrium growth factor of the capital stock per worker, γt+1 ≡ kt+1/kt, is
constant and given by
γt+1 =
B
1 + n
(
α− τPh
) ≡ γ, (3.5)
with B ≡ A 1α (1− α) 1−αα B˜. The economy immediately settles on its steady-state path on
which the economy’s relevant variables such as per capita consumption, per capita output,
the per capita capital stock, government spending as well as wages all grow at the same
constant rate γ − 1.
According to Proposition 1, under rational voting both types of government expenditure
are chosen as constant shares of output. The equilibrium share of output devoted to
the productive public input corresponds to 1 − α, which is the output elasticity of the
productive public input. Thus, productive government expenditure satisfies the so-called
natural condition of productive efficiency, i. e., the marginal contribution of government
expenditure to aggregate output is one (see, e.g., Barro, 1990). In the present context, as
aggregate output is Y = AKαG1−α, we have dY/dG = (1− α)(Y/G) = (1− α)(y/g) = 1.
This also implies that the young and the old prefer the same share of output devoted
to productive purposes. In other words, there is no conflict about this type of public
spending. The reason for this is that gt symmetrically affects the labor income of the
young and the capital income of the old.
The equilibrium share of output spent on the public consumption good benefiting the old
is given by τPh and depends on preferences, technology, and demographic parameters. In-
tuitively, it balances the interests of the elderly who support public consumption spending
as long as the related benefits outweigh the tax costs and those of the young taxpayers
who oppose this form of spending as they are net contributors to the system. This re-
flects the intergenerational conflict more realistically than what would be observed under
simple majority voting. For instance, assume that the median voter is a young agent.16
Then, if we anticipate that all agents will prefer the same share of productive government
16In a two-period OLG model there are always more young people than old as long as n > 0.
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spending such that the voting problem becomes one-dimensional, we find that the median
voter would set public consumption spending on the old equal to zero. In our probabilistic
voting setup, τPh = 0 could only occur if the old had no political influence at all (i. e., if
ω = 0) or if they did not care about the public consumption good (i. e., if b = 0).17
The equilibrium income tax rate corresponds to the sum of the two public expenditure
shares and turns out to be strictly smaller than one such that the equilibrium policy mix
is feasible. Moreover, note that the income tax rate in equilibrium is time-invariant. In
other words, it is independent of the economy’s endogenous state variable, i. e., the capital
stock per worker. Nevertheless, the equilibrium tax rate will be affected by population
aging because it depends on demographic parameters.
Finally, Proposition 1 reveals that in the politico-economic equilibrium the economy’s
relevant variables in per capita terms grow at the same constant rate given by γ − 1.
There is no guarantee that this rate is positive for all parameter combinations. However,
a positive steady-state growth rate can be assured if we assume that the economy is
sufficiently productive, i. e., if A is large enough.
The following corollary verifies that the Markov perfect equilibrium derived above is the
limit of a unique finite-horizon equilibrium.18
Corollary 1 (Limit of Finite-Horizon Economy)
The equilibrium policy functions gt = (1−α)yt and ht = τPh yt of Proposition 1 represent the
unique equilibrium policy mix in (the limit of) the corresponding finite-horizon economy.
In the last period, the policy function for ht is different, but also unique.
4 The Ramsey Allocation
This section compares the politico-economic equilibrium with the Ramsey allocation cho-
sen by a benevolent planner who has the ability to commit to all its future policy choices
at the beginning of time, but is constrained by the same economic equilibrium conditions.
Specifically, we consider the Ramsey solution in the case where the planner’s weight on
generation t ≥ 0 is βt+1(1 +n)t+1, i. e., the planner’s weights on future generations reflect
the discount factor of households as well as the cohort size (“dynastic discounting”).19
17In this paper we abstract from these polar cases.
18This allows us to rule out potential reputation-like equilibria that can only be supported if the horizon
is infinite.
19See, e. g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) for a discussion.
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The planner’s decision problem is therefore to choose the sequence {gt, ht}∞t=0 in order to
maximize
W (k0, {gt, ht}∞t=0) ≡ βUO0 +
∞∑
t=0
(β (1 + n))t+1 UYt
subject to (2.13)− (2.15) and k0 given. (4.1)
In the following we assume that β(1 + n) < 1 such that the planner’s objective function
W is finite.
The main difference to the program solved by the political candidates is that the Ramsey
program (4.1) involves the choice of an entire sequence of policy mixes. Moreover, the
Ramsey planner values the welfare of all households, not only of those currently alive and
voting.
In order to solve for the Ramsey allocation it is helpful to first establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 The Ramsey program (4.1) is equivalent to the following recursive program:
V (kt) = max{gt,ht,kt+1}
{Tt (gt, ht, kt) + (1 + n)βV (kt+1)} for t ≥ 0, (4.2)
subject to (2.13), where Tt (gt, ht, kt) ≡ β (2 + n) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ βb lnht.
The fact that the planner’s problem admits the standard recursive formulation of Lemma
1 reveals that its solution is time consistent. Intuitively, the generational weights (in the
case of dynastic discounting) are such that the Ramsey plan is dynamically consistent
(see, e. g., Heijdra, 2009, p.656-658).
The following proposition summarizes the solution of the Ramsey problem.
Proposition 2 (The Ramsey Allocation)
Let β(1 + n) < 1. Then, the solution of the Ramsey program (4.1) involves for t ≥ 0
gt = (1− α) yt and ht = τRh yt,
where yt = A1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α kt and 0 < τRh ≡ αb (1− (1 + n)β) (2 + n+ b)−1 < α.
Moreover, gt, ht, yt and kt grow at the same constant rate determined by (2.13).
Proposition 2 reveals that the Ramsey planner sets the levels of both types of government
expenditure proportional to output. He chooses the same share of output, namely 1− α,
to be devoted to the productive public input as in the politico-economic equilibrium. The
optimal share of output spent on the public consumption good benefiting the old is given
by τRh and depends again on preferences, technology, and demographic parameters. The
following corollary compares τRh to τ
P
h of the politico-economic equilibrium.
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Corollary 2 (Ramsey Allocation vs. Politico-Economic Equilibrium)
It holds that
τRh ≤ τPh ⇔ ω ≥ 1− β(1 + n).
Corollary 2 shows that the share of public spending on the elderly chosen by the Ramsey
planner falls short of the corresponding share in the politico-economic equilibrium when-
ever ω or β (1 + n) are sufficiently large. For instance, this is the case for any ω ≥ 1, i. e.,
if the old have at least the same per capita political weight as the young.
The intuition for τRh < τ
P
h is that voters in their optimization problem only consider the
effects of their policy choice that materialize during their lifetimes. Negative consequences
borne by subsequent generations due to higher taxes and lower capital accumulation are
not taken into account. By contrast, the Ramsey planner internalizes the effects of policy
on all current and future households.
5 Implications of Population Aging
5.1 Declining Population Growth
This section studies the effect of a permanent decline in the population growth rate n
on government policy and economic growth in the politico-economic equilibrium. The
decline in the population growth rate is due to a decline in fertility and causes a rise in
the old-age dependency ratio (1 + n)−1. Increases in the latter are meant to capture the
tendencies shown in Table 1. The decline in n materializes at the beginning of the period
(see Section 2.4) and is then taken into account by all agents alive in that period. Note
that it does not affect the results whether or not the decline in n is anticipated by the
generation born in the previous period as their savings decision is independent of n (see
equation 2.7).
In the politico-economic equilibrium of Proposition 1 the economy at all t grows at the
constant rate γ − 1 given by (3.5). Recall that there are no transitional dynamics in the
economy. Denote τg the fraction of current output devoted to productive public services,
i. e., τg = gt/yt = 1 − α. Then, the results of the comparative static analysis described
above can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 (Population Growth, Government Spending, and Economic Growth)
1. If ω 6= (1 + n), then it holds that
dτPh
dn
< 0,
dτg
dn
= 0, and
dτ
dn
< 0.
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2. It holds that
dγ
dn
< 0.
The first statement of Corollary 3 reveals that an increase in the old-age dependency ratio
(due to a decline in n) raises τPh , i. e., the fraction of output used for the provision of
public services that benefit the old. The reason is that a decline in n reduces the share of
young agents relative to old agents in the population, and thus their weight in the political
objective function (3.1). Intuitively, the old prefer greater spending on the public con-
sumption good than the young. In the non-generic case ω = 1 +n, i. e., when both groups
have exactly the same weight in the political objective function, τPh does not depend on
n. The share of output devoted to the productive public input corresponds to 1− α, and
is thus always independent of the population growth rate. Overall, the income tax rate,
τ , which is levied on households to finance government expenditure, has to increase in the
politico-economic equilibrium. Statement 1 of Corollary 3 also implies that population
aging increases the share of public consumptive expenditure in total government expen-
diture, i. e., τPh /τ , and decreases the share of productive government expenditure in total
government expenditure given by (1− α)/τ .
According to the second statement of Corollary 3, an increase in the old-age dependency
ratio leads to a higher equilibrium growth rate of per capita variables. This is the result
of two opposing forces. On the one hand, reduced labor force growth weakens the effect of
capital dilution, i. e., a given amount of capital implies a higher capital stock per worker at
each t and a rise in the equilibrium growth rate of per capita variables. Intuitively, a lower
n reduces the break-even investment, the amount of investment necessary for k to grow at
a constant rate, without affecting saving at any given level of capital.20 On the other hand,
there is a negative, indirect tax effect via τPh . As discussed in the previous paragraph,
an increase in the old-age dependency ratio raises spending for the public consumption
good, and thus taxes. Since taxes are levied on capital and labor income, they reduce
the incentive to save and to accumulate capital, and hence have a negative effect on the
steady-state growth rate. The point of the second statement of Corollary 3 is that the
former effect dominates the latter. Therefore, population aging accelerates the economy’s
growth rate of per capita variables.
Finally, Corollary 3 implies that an increase in the old-age dependency ratio in the long run
raises the benefits derived by each old agent from aggregate public consumption spending.
To see this note that h˜t is given by
h˜t = (1 + n)ht = (1 + n)τPh yt = (1 + n)τ
P
h y0e
(γ−1)t. (5.1)
20In the context of a conventional neoclassical growth model, Cutler et al. (1990) refer to this channel
as the “Solow effect”.
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From the definition of τPh in Proposition 1 one readily verifies that (1 +n)τ
P
h y0 declines if
n decreases. Thus, the level of benefits per old initially falls, but then grows at a higher
rate (as dγ/dn < 0) and at some point reaches a higher level than what would have
be attainable without a change in n.21 The initial decline is due to congestion effects;
intuitively, the benefits of the public consumption good have to be spread over more old
people.
5.2 Increasing Life Expectancy
In the previous section, we studied population aging as a decline in the population growth
rate. With a slight reinterpretation of the analytical framework, we can also analyze the
effect of an increasing life expectancy on government policy and economic growth.
For this purpose, suppose that each individual faces an exogenous probability of dying at
the end of its first period of life equal to (1 − v) ∈ (0, 1). This implies that the old-age
dependency ratio at t becomes vLt−1/Lt and increases in v.22
Let βv ∈ (0, 1) denote the pure discount factor, i. e., the discount factor that the individual
would apply if he or she were sure to reach the retirement age. Moreover, normalize the
utility after death to zero. Then, we may interpret the utility function of (2.1) as the
expected utility of a member of generation t with β ≡ βvv as the effective discount factor
of the agent and with h˜t+1 ≡ Ht+1/vLt as the provision of the public consumption good
per surviving old agent.
Against the survival risk individuals may buy annuity assets with which they receive in-
surance payments if they are alive and nothing if dead in the retirement period. Assuming
that the private annuity markets are perfectly competitive, insurance payments are actu-
arially fair.
Finally, let ωv denote the pure per capita political weight of the old, i. e., the political
power the old would exert if all individuals survived. Then, the political objective function
remains given by (3.1) with ω ≡ ωvv as the effective political weight of the old and the
economy inherits the properties established in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
21By contrast, if aggregate public consumption spending H entered the utility function (2.1) as a pure
public good, then an increase in the old-age dependency ratio would lower the level of H in the long
run. To see this note that in this case the level of public consumption services would be given by Ht =
τPh Yt = τ
P
h Y0e
gKt, where gK = B(α − τPh ) − 1 corresponds to the growth rate of aggregate variables. As
dτPh /dn < 0 and dgK/dτ
P
h < 0, a decline in n thus implies that Ht initially increases, but then grows at
a lower rate. Therefore, population aging here leads to an increase in taxes and at the same time to a
decline in the long-term provision of H. The reason for this is that the tax base is lower at all t.
22Note that the population growth rate in this framework still corresponds to n.
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A permanent increase in life expectancy due to a permanent rise in the survival probability,
v, increases the effective discount factor, β, and the effective political weight of the old,
ω. The following proposition summarizes the effects of such an increase on government
policy and the equilibrium growth rate.
Proposition 3 (Life Expectancy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth)
Consider an economy that at t = 1 experiences a small but permanent increase in its life
expectancy, i. e., vˆ > v for all generations t = 1, 2, 3, ...,∞. Assume that this change is
unexpected, i. e., it is anticipated by all generations t = 2, 3, ...,∞, but not by generation 1.
Denote variables associated with an evolution under vˆ by a hat such that the politico-
economic equilibrium at t is characterized by τˆPht and γˆt+1.
Then, it holds that
τˆPh1 = τ
P
h , γˆ2 = γ, and
τˆPht = τˆ
P
h > τ
P
h , γˆt+1 = γˆ > γ for t = 2, 3, ...,∞.
Proposition 3 reveals that an increase in life expectancy increases the share of public con-
sumption spending and the equilibrium growth rate. Intuitively, a higher life expectancy
increases savings per next period’s worker since the weight on the expected old-age utility
increases. This has a positive effect on capital accumulation and dominates the negative
tax effect that results from a greater political weight of the old.
However, contrary to the case of a permanent decline in the population growth rate,
this effect is delayed by one generation. The reason for this is that the increase in life
expectancy is unexpected, i. e., generation 1 makes its consumption and savings plan
anticipating an effective discount factor of β instead of βˆ.23
Arguably, this is a realistic assumption as expectations of one’s own life expectancy are
usually myopic, i. e., coincide with the actual life expectancy of the previous generation.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the choice of s1 is made by the young agents
before the change in the survival probability is experienced.
Consequently, a permanent increase in life expectancy affects public spending and eco-
nomic growth in the same direction as a decline in the population growth rate, but with
a period delay.
23If the increase in life expectancy were anticipated by generation 1, then savings would already increase
in t = 1. However, the effective political weight of the elderly (ωvv) and the public policy choice in t = 1
are not affected by an anticipated change in life expectancy. In t = 1, the young of generation 1 and the
old of generation 0, whose size is determined by the initial life expectancy v, vote on government policy.
Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate would first jump to a level γˆ2 > γˆ and then from t = 2 onwards
correspond to γˆ. For a more detailed discussion see the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
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6 Discussion and Extensions
This section discusses and extends the analysis in two directions. First, Section 6.1 com-
pares the politico-economic equilibrium to two other voting equilibria. Second, Section 6.2
presents numerical examples for two alternative preference specifications.
6.1 Other Voting Equilibria
In this section we compare the politico-economic equilibrium of Section 3 to (i) the voting
equilibrium that results when voters ex-ante are restricted to choose constant policy paths
and (ii) the myopic voting equilibrium.
6.1.1 Voting Equilibrium under Commitment to Constant Policy Paths
This section analyzes a voting equilibrium in which taxes and expenditure shares are ex-
ante restricted to a constant path. In other words, we assume that the political candidates
in period t propose and fully commit to policies that set government expenditure as the
same constant fraction of output.
For this purpose, suppose that a feasible government policy is a vector (τ cg , τ
c
h) ∈ [0, 1]×
[0, 1] such that gt = τ cgyt, ht = τ
c
hyt and τ
c = (τ cg + τ
c
h) ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise the economic
environment is identical to that of Section 2.
Then, following the same steps as in Section 2.5 the economic equilibrium in period t, i. e.,
the allocation conditional on the policy mix (τ cg , τ
c
h) and for a given kt is characterized by
cyt =
1− α
1 + β
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
yt, (6.1)
cot = α(1 + n)
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
yt, (6.2)
kt+1 =
B˜
1 + n
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
yt, (6.3)
with yt = A1/α
(
τ cg
)(1−α)/α
kt.
Using equations (6.1) - (6.3) and dropping terms independent of policy yields the indirect
utilities of a young and an old agent at t as
UYt ' [1 + β (2 + b)] ln
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
+ [1 + 2β (1 + b)]
1− α
α
ln τ cg
+βb ln τ ch, (6.4)
and
UOt ' ln
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
+ (1 + b)
1− α
α
ln τ cg + b ln τ
c
h, (6.5)
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respectively.
The political candidates in period t then choose (τ cg , τ
c
h) to maximize the political objec-
tive function (3.1) with UYt and U
O
t given by (6.4) and (6.5). The following proposition
establishes the equilibrium policy mix and the resulting economic growth rate.
Proposition 4 (Voting Equilibrium under Commitment to Constant Policy Paths)
The equilibrium policy mix under commitment to constant policy paths is given by
τ cg = 1− α and τ ch =
((1 + n)β + ω)αb
(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
< α. (6.6)
Under this policy mix, the economy’s growth factor of all per capita variables, government
spending and wages is given by
γc =
B
1 + n
(α− τ ch). (6.7)
Proposition 4 reveals that policy makers in this voting equilibrium also set the share of
output devoted to the productive public input equal to 1 − α.24 The following corollary
concerns public consumption spending on the elderly.
Corollary 4 (Commitment to Constant Policy Paths vs. Politico-Economic Equilibrium)
Comparing the share of output spent on the public consumption good for the elderly, τ ch
of (6.6), to the corresponding expenditure share in the politico-economic equilibrium of
Proposition 1 yields
τ ch > τ
P
h .
Thus, policy makers that commit to a constant tax path will opt for a higher share of
public consumption spending in output than in the politico-economic equilibrium without
commitment. Intuitively, when voting on government policy today the current young are
aware that they decide about the expenditure share for public good provision that benefits
them tomorrow. Hence, they choose a higher share of output to be spent on these services
than in the politico-economic equilibrium.
The implications of population aging on the voting equilibrium of Proposition 4 are sum-
marized in the following corollary.
24In other words, they choose the same share as in the politico-economic equilibrium and as a Ramsey
planner.
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Corollary 5 (Implications of Population Aging under Commitment to Constant Policy
Paths)
An increase in the old-age dependency ratio - either due to a permanent decline in the
population growth rate or due to a permanent, but unexpected increase in life expectancy
- does not affect τ cg , but increases τ
c
h and γ
c. In the case of an increase in life expectancy
the latter effects are delayed by one period.
Thus, we can conclude that qualitatively the effects of population aging on government
spending and economic growth in this voting equilibrium are the same as in the politico-
economic equilibrium (see Corollary 3 and Proposition 3).
6.1.2 Myopic Voting Equilibrium
This section derives the equilibrium policy mix when agents vote myopically, i. e., when
they ignore the effect of the current political decision on future political outcomes, and
then compares it to the politico-economic equilibrium of Section 3.
More specifically, in a myopic voting equilibrium agents at t treat future policy variables,
i. e., gt+1, ht+1, and τt+1, as given. However, they are aware that their policy choice today
affects tomorrow’s capital stock and output per worker. Then, the economic equilibrium
at t continues to be characterized by equations (2.11) - (2.13). Moreover, using (2.13) we
obtain consumption of an agent that is old in period t+ 1 as
cot+1 = (1 + n)α (1− τt+1)Akαt+1g1−αt+1
= (1 + n)1−ααAB˜α
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)a
g1−αt+1 (1− τt+1) .
Omitting all terms independent of policy and those that involve future policy variables (as
they are treated as exogenous), the relevant indirect utilities of a young and an old agent
at t are
UYt ' (1 + aβ) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
(6.8)
and
UOt ' ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ b lnht, (6.9)
respectively. The political candidates at t then choose (gt, ht) to maximize the political ob-
jective function (3.1) with UYt and U
O
t given by (6.8) and (6.9). The following proposition
provides the equilibrium policy mix and the resulting economic growth rate.
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Proposition 5 (Myopic Voting Equilibrium)
The equilibrium policy mix under myopic voting for all t is given by
gt = (1− α)yt (6.10)
and
ht = τmh yt, where τ
m
h =
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω (1 + b)
< α (6.11)
and yt = A1/α(1− α)(1−α)/αkt.
Under this policy mix, the economy’s growth factor of all per capita variables, government
spending and wages is given by
γm =
B
1 + n
(α− τmh ). (6.12)
Proposition 5 reveals that policy makers in this voting equilibrium again choose the same
share of output to be devoted to the productive public input, namely 1−α. With respect
to the equilibrium share of public consumption spending, we can establish the following
corollary.
Corollary 6 (Myopic Voting Equilibrium vs. Politico-Economic Equilibrium)
Comparing the share of output spent on the public consumption good for the elderly given
by (6.11) to the corresponding expenditure share in the politico-economic equilibrium of
Proposition 1 yields
τmh > τ
P
h .
Thus, if agents vote myopically the equilibrium share of government expenditure for the
public consumption good exceeds the one of the politico-economic equilibrium. The reason
for this is that the young agents at t neglect that the choice of ht via savings and the
accumulation of capital affects tomorrow’s provision, ht+1. Therefore, they agree to a too
high spending level today.
The implications of population aging on the myopic voting equilibrium of Proposition 5
are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 7 (Implications of Population Aging on the Myopic Voting Equilibrium)
An increase in the old-age dependency ratio - either due to a permanent decline in the
population growth rate or due to a permanent, but unexpected increase in life expectancy -
does not affect τmg , but increases τ
m
h and γ
m. In the case of an increase in life expectancy
the latter effects are delayed by one period.
Thus, we can conclude that qualitatively the effects of population aging on government
spending and economic growth in a myopic voting equilibrium are the same as in the
politico-economic equilibrium (see Corollary 3 and Proposition 3).
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6.2 Alternative Utility Functions
This section presents several numerical examples to gauge the sensitivity of the compar-
ative static effects of population aging to the specification of the utility function. In
particular, we consider two alternative specifications: one with a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the other with non-separable preferences between private and
public consumption when old. Both specifications encompass the benchmark separable,
log utility function of (2.1) as a special case. Otherwise the economic framework is as
described in Section 2.
A necessary price of this sensitivity analysis is that (at some point) we must adopt specific
parameters for the model. For this purpose, let a period represent 30 years. Then, set
β = 0.55, implying a 2% annual discount rate. The parameter that measures the weight
of public relative to private consumption in the utility function is b = 0.1. As there is
no strong prior on ω, we simply assume equal political weights on the young and the old
(ω = 1).25 Moreover, a parameter value for the output elasticity of productive government
expenditure, 1 − α, is needed. As one period represents 30 years, it seems acceptable to
suppose that an estimate of the output elasticity of public capital is a good proxy for
1 − α. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) review the empirical results related to the output
elasticity of public capital and find estimates in the range of zero to 0.39. Therefore, we
choose 1−α = 0.2 as an intermediate value. This implies that the elasticity of output with
respect to private capital corresponds to α = 0.8. This appears reasonable if we consider
that private capital encompasses physical as well as human capital.
We start with the assumption that the population growth rate is 2% annually. This annual
rate corresponds to growth of 81% over a model period (n = 1.0230 − 1 ' 0.81). This in
turn implies an old-age dependency ratio of (1 +n)−1 = 0.55. Note that in a model where
agents live for two periods, it is impossible to match the actual population growth rate
and the old-age dependency ratio of a country. The above choice reflects this trade-off,
with both the population growth rate and the dependency ratio being somewhat higher
than currently in Europe or in the US.26 Then, we investigate the comparative static
effect resulting from a shift in the population growth rate from 2.0% to 1.0%. In other
words, n declines to 0.35 and the dependency ratio rises to 0.74. Finally, the productivity
parameter A is set such that the annual growth rate of per capita variables is 1.8% for the
benchmark utility (2.1) when n = 0.81.
25However, we have solved for a range of economies with ω different from unity and holding constant the
other parameters. The comparative static results are qualitatively unchanged. Moreover and equivalently
to the log utility case, the results suggest that dτPh /dω > 0.
26Introducing a survival probability v 6= 1 as in Section 5.2 allows - conditional on n - to calibrate the
ratio of retirees to workers.
25
6.2.1 Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution Utility Function
This section generalizes the analysis to a more general constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution utility function. Assume that the preferences of an individual born at t are
described by
(cyt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ + β
(cot+1)1−σ − 11− σ + b
(
h˜t+1
)1−σ − 1
1− σ
 , (6.13)
where σ > 0 and 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This specification
includes the benchmark log utility for σ → 1.
One aim of this generalization is to analyze whether there is a third channel (besides the
two discussed in Section 5.1 ) by which a decline in the population growth rate potentially
affects the steady-state growth rate. In a standard two-period OLG model under (6.13)
with b = 0 and a neoclassical production function Yt = Kαt L
1−α
t an increase in the capital
stock per worker (e. g. due to decline in n) lowers the rental rate of capital. If the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is different from unity this in turn affects savings,
and thus the accumulation of capital. However, in the present framework the interest
rate (independent of the utility specification) turns out to be constant in the politico-
economic equilibrium. Hence, this third channel is mute and we will see that the qualitative
comparative static results are unchanged.
To see this, we first derive the economic equilibrium at t and then define the politico-
economic equilibrium. Finally, numerical results for the equilibrium policy mix are pre-
sented. We consider the three cases: σ = 0.5, σ = 1, and σ = 2, with the other parameters
as described above.
The Economic Equilibrium
Maximizing the lifetime utility of an individual born at t given by (6.13) subject to her
per-period budget constraints, and then taking into account the remaining equilibrium
conditions of Section 2.5, i. e., equations (2.8) - (2.10), yields the equilibrium allocation at
t as
cyt =
(1− τt)wt
1 + β
1
σ [(1− τt+1)Rt+1]
1−σ
σ
=
(1− α) (yt − gt − ht)
1 + β
1
σ
[
α(yt+1−gt+1−ht+1)
kt+1
] 1−σ
σ
, (6.14)
cot = kt(1 + n) (1− τt)Rt = α (1 + n) (yt − gt − ht) , (6.15)
kt+1 =
(1 + n)−1 (1− τt)wt
1 + β−
1
σ [(1− τt+1)Rt+1]
σ−1
σ
=
(1 + n)−1 (1− α) (yt − gt − ht)
1 + β−
1
σ
[
α(yt+1−gt+1−ht+1)
kt+1
]σ−1
σ
. (6.16)
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The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In a politico-economic equilibrium the public policy rules
〈
pig, pih
〉
have to maximize the
political objective function Ut = (1 + n)UYt + ωU
O
t with
UYt =
(cyt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ + β
(
cot+1
)1−σ − 1
1− σ + βb
(ht+1(1 + n))
1−σ − 1
1− σ
and
UOt =
(cot )
1−σ − 1
1− σ + b
(ht(1 + n))
1−σ − 1
1− σ ,
subject to (6.14) - (6.16).
Making the same policy guess as in Section 3.3, i. e., pig (kt+1) = ηgkt+1 and pih (kt+1) =
ηhkt+1, the economic equilibrium conditions (6.14) - (6.16) yield
cyt = Y (yt − gt − ht) , Y ≡
1− α
1 + β
1
σ
[
α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh
)] 1−σ
σ
,
cot+1 = Z (yt − gt − ht) , Z ≡
(1− α)α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh
)
1 + β−
1
σ
[
α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh
)]σ−1
σ
,
kt+1 =
X (yt − gt − ht)
1 + n
, X ≡ 1− α
1 + β−
1
σ
[
α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh
)]σ−1
σ
.
Using the latter conditions and omitting additive constant terms, the political objective
function simplifies to
Ut =
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + βZ1−σ + βb
(
ηhX
)1−σ)
+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ
)
(yt − gt − ht)1−σ
1− σ
+ ωb (1 + n)1−σ
(ht)
1−σ
1− σ , (6.17)
and the equilibrium policy mix (gt, ht) has to maximize (6.17). The first-order conditions
of this optimization problem with respect to gt and ht are
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + βZ1−σ + βb
(
ηhX
)1−σ)+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ)((1− α) ytgt − 1)
(yt − gt − ht)σ = 0
and
−
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + βZ1−σ + βb
(
ηhX
)1−σ)+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ)
(yt − gt − ht)σ +
ωb (1 + n)1−σ
(ht)
σ = 0,
respectively.
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The former condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1− α) yt which verifies our guess for
ηg = A1/α (1− α)1/α. If a political equilibrium exists, i. e., if the guess for ht can also be
verified, then the above result implies that the equilibrium interest rate is constant and
given by R = αA1/α(1− α)(1−α)/α.27
Using gt = A1/α (1− α)1/α kt and the guess ht = ηhkt in the second first-order condition
then yields
ηh =
αD
1 +
(
ωb (1 + n)1−σ
)− 1
σ
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + β
(
Z1−σ + b (ηhX)1−σ
))
+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ
) 1
σ
(6.18)
where D ≡ A1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α =
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg
)
/α. For the guess to be correct con-
dition (6.18) needs to have a unique solution for ηh in the interval (0, αD). As this
problem cannot be solved analytically, the following section considers numerical examples
for σ = 0.5 and σ = 2 and compares them to the benchmark case of σ = 1.
Numerical Results
In this section, we set A = 34.5, implying an annual growth rate of per capita variables
of 1.8% if σ = 1. For both choices of σ exists a unique ηh ∈ (0, αD) that solves (6.18).
The results are summarized in Table 2. Note that τPh ≡ ηh/D denotes the share of public
consumption spending that benefits the elderly in aggregate output.28
Table 2: Comparative Static Analysis of Demographic Change: CIES Utility
σ n = 0.81 n = 0.35
0.5 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0009 0.0011
annual p.c. growth rate 5.16% 6.19%
1 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0200 0.0245
annual p.c. growth rate 1.80% 2.78%
2 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0475 0.0621
annual p.c. growth rate −2.11% −1.19%
27For this reason, the savings decision even in the CIES case with σ 6= 1 is independent of n and it does
not matter whether the change in n is anticipated or not.
28All examples were computed using Maple. All files are available upon request.
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Table 2 suggests that an intertemporal elasticity of substitution different from unity does
not alter the qualitative comparative static results of Section 5.1, i. e., dτPh /dn < 0 and
dγ/dn < 0. Nevertheless, the equilibrium ratio of public spending on the elderly and the
equilibrium growth rate depend on σ. The numerical examples reveal that dτPh /dσ > 0 and
dγ/dσ < 0. Intuitively, a greater intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i. e., a smaller
σ) implies a stronger negative substitution effect of a higher tax rate on savings such that
households prefer a lower tax rate, which in turn involves a higher growth rate.
6.2.2 Non-Separable Preferences
This section generalizes the analysis to non-separable preferences between private and
public consumption when old. Assume that the preferences of an individual born at t are
given by
ln cyt + β ln
([
1
1 + b
(
cot+1
)ρ + b
1 + b
(
h˜t+1
)ρ] 1ρ)
, (6.19)
where ρ < 1. This specification encompasses the benchmark separable log utility as ρ →
0.29 Private and public consumption when old are substitutes if ρ > 0 and complements
if ρ < 0. This generalization has interesting implications: for instance, if agents can
substitute private for public health services when old they will be less concerned for public
good provision and vote for a lower tax rate. Nevertheless, the qualitative comparative
static results with respect to population aging will not be affected by this generalization.
Equivalently to Section 6.2.1, we first determine the economic equilibrium and then analyze
the politico-economic equilibrium analytically. To analyze the comparative static effects of
a decline in the population growth rate we consider three numerical examples for ρ = −0.1,
ρ = 0, and ρ = 0.1, with the other parameters as before.
The Economic Equilibrium
Maximizing the lifetime utility (6.19) with respect to an individual’s per-period budget
constraints delivers the following implicit characterization of optimal savings at t
β (1− τt)wt = st
[
1 + β + b
(
h˜t+1
st (1− τt+1)Rt+1
)ρ]
. (6.20)
Optimal consumption of a young and an old agent at t then follow from the respective
per-period budget constraints.
Taking into account the equilibrium conditions (2.8) - (2.10), equation (6.20) becomes
β (1− α) (yt − gt − ht) = kt+1 (1 + n)
[
1 + β + b
(
ht+1
α (yt+1 − gt+1 − ht+1)
)ρ]
. (6.21)
29Note that for ρ → 0 (6.19) reduces to ln cyt + β/(1 + b)
(
ln cot+1 + b ln h˜t+1
)
. This specification only
differs from the benchmark utility (2.1) by a constant factor which does not affect the qualitative results.
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The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In a politico-economic equilibrium the public policy rules
〈
pig, pih
〉
have to maximize the
political objective function Ut = (1 + n)UYt +ωU
O
t with the indirect utilities of the young
and the old at t (disregarding terms independent of policy) given by
UYt ' ln cyt +
β
ρ
ln
[(
cot+1
)ρ + b (ht+1)ρ (1 + n)ρ]
and
UOt '
1
ρ
ln [(cot )
ρ + b (ht)
ρ (1 + n)ρ] .
With the linear policy guess, pig (kt+1) = ηgkt+1 and pih (kt+1) = ηhkt+1, condition (6.21)
can be written as
kt+1 (1 + n) =
β (1− α) (yt − gt − ht)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ . (6.22)
Moreover, using st = kt+1(1 + n) and (6.21) in the per-period budget constraints yields
consumption of a young and an old agent at t as
cyt = X (yt − gt − ht) , where X ≡
(1− α)
(
1 + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ (6.23)
and
cot = (1 + n)α (yt − gt − ht) , (6.24)
respectively. Additionally, we obtain the levels of private and public consumption of an
old agent at t+ 1 as
cot+1 = Y (yt − gt − ht) , where Y ≡
β (1− α)α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh
)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ (6.25)
and
h˜t+1 = Z (yt − gt − ht) , where Z ≡ η
hβ (1− α)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ , (6.26)
respectively. Using conditions (6.23) - (6.26) in the indirect utility functions and omitting
terms independent of policy variables, the political objective function simplifies to
Ut = (1 + n) (1 + β) ln (yt − gt − ht) + ω
ρ
ln [αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ + b (ht)ρ] (6.27)
and the equilibrium policy mix (gt, ht) has to maximize (6.27). The first-order conditions
of this optimization problem with respect to gt and ht are
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[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
][
(1 + n) (1 + β)
yt − gt − ht +
ωαρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ−1
αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ + b (ht)ρ
]
= 0
and
− (1 + n) (1 + β)
yt − gt − ht + ω
−αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ−1 + b (ht)ρ−1
αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ + b (ht)ρ = 0,
respectively.
The first condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1− α) yt which verifies our guess for
ηg = A1/α (1− α)1/α. If a political equilibrium exists, i. e., if the guess for ht can also be
verified, then the above result again implies that the equilibrium interest rate is constant
and given by R = αD, where D ≡ A1/α(1− α)(1−α)/α.
Then, using gt = A1/α (1− α)1/α kt and the guess ht = τPh yt, where τPh ≡ ηh/D, in the
second first-order condition and rearranging yields
(1 + n) (1 + β) = ω
−1 + α−ρb (τPh )ρ−1 (α− τPh )1−ρ
1 + α−ρb
(
τPh
)ρ (
α− τPh
)−ρ . (6.28)
For the guess to be correct, condition (6.28) needs to have a unique solution τPh in the
interval (0, α). This is the case for not too large values of ρ. For a proof of this see the
Appendix.
Numerical Results
To analyze the comparative static effect of a decline in the population growth rate, this
section considers numerical examples for ρ = −0.1 and ρ = 0.1 and compares them to the
benchmark case of ρ = 0.
In the examples of this section, we set A = 36.198 in order to again obtain an annual
growth rate of per capita variables of 1.80% if ρ = 0. For both choices of ρ, there exists a
unique τPh ∈ (0, α) that solves (6.28). The results are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 suggests that allowing for non-separable preferences between private and pub-
lic consumption when old does not change the qualitative comparative static results of
Section 5.1, i. e., dτPh /dn < 0 and dγ/dn < 0.
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Table 3: Comparative Static Analysis of Demographic Change: Non-Separable Preferences
ρ n = 0.81 n = 0.35
−0.1 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0254 0.0308
annual p.c. growth rate 1.70% 2.68%
0 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0191 0.0235
annual p.c. growth rate 1.80% 2.78%
0.1 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0134 0.0168
annual p.c. growth rate 1.89% 2.87%
Moreover, the numerical examples reveal that the equilibrium ratio of public spending on
the elderly declines in ρ, i. e., dτPh /dρ < 0. Intuitively, a higher degree of substitutability
between private and public consumption goods makes the old less concerned for the public
consumption good and induces them to vote for a lower spending ratio.
7 Concluding Remarks
What is the role of population aging for the composition of government spending and
long-term economic growth? This paper addressed this question in an overlapping gener-
ations model in which economic growth is endogenous and agents each period vote on the
composition of government spending between productive public expenditure and public
consumption spending on the elderly. Population aging corresponds either to a decline in
the population growth rate or to an increase in life expectancy. Both phenomena increase
the economy’s old-age dependency ratio.
The model predicts that population aging, by increasing the relative weight of the old in
the political process, leads to an increase in public spending on the elderly (as a share of
output), but does not affect the share of public productive expenditure in output. This
is in line with recent evidence (see Section 1). To finance the additional government
spending, the income tax rate has to increase, which in turn has a negative effect on the
economy’s growth rate of per capita variables. However, the model also suggests that
population aging overall accelerates the economy’s growth rate. If the increase in the
old-age dependency ratio is due to a decline in the population growth rate, then reduced
capital dilution is at the source of this acceleration of growth. By contrast, an increase in
life expectancy generates higher long-term growth by strengthening the incentives to save.
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The present analysis leaves scope for future research. For instance, for analytical tractabil-
ity this paper introduced the productive public input as a flow into production. Consid-
ering that the length of a model period corresponds to one generation, this appears to be
a good benchmark. Alternatively, one could treat the publicly-provided productive input
as a stock rather than as a flow, thereby introducing public as well as private capital. In
this case the advantages of a larger public investment today only materialize tomorrow
whereas the tax costs have to be borne today. Then, the young and the old are no longer
symmetrically affected by current public productive spending. Additionally, the stock ap-
proach introduces transitional equilibrium dynamics into the analysis. This would allow
us to study the effects of the projected demographic transition not only on the steady
state but also on the dynamics of transition between steady states. A second suggestion
for future research is to disentangle the uniform income tax rate into a separate labor and
capital income tax rate. This introduces another dimension of policy choice and a further
source of potential conflict between the young and the old. It would be interesting to see
whether in this case the public consumption good that benefits the elderly will be entirely
financed via capital income taxes and the productive public input via both types of taxes.
Appendix
Detailed Derivation of Condition (3.3)
The first-order conditions of the program (3.2) with respect to gt and ht are
U¯gt =
(1− α) yt − gt
gt (yt − gt − ht) [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω] = 0 (.1)
U¯ht = −
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω
yt − gt − ht +
ωb
ht
= 0, (.2)
where U¯x ≡ ∂U¯/∂x. The first condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1−α)yt. Using this
in the second condition and rearranging yields
[(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]ht = ωb (αyt − ht) , (.3)
and thus
ht =
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡τPh
yt. (.4)
Thus, the unique interior solution is given by gt = (1 − α)yt and ht = τPh yt as stated in
the main text.
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Proof of Proposition 1
In addition to what is stated in the text, it remains to be verified that (i) the first-order
conditions are sufficient for a global maximum, (ii) the economy’s relevant variables grow
at the rate γ − 1.
(i) The unique interior solution derived above is a global maximum if
U¯gtgt < 0, U¯htht < 0 and U¯gtgtU¯htht −
(
U¯gtht
)2
> 0, for any (gt, ht),
where U¯xy ≡ ∂2U¯/∂x∂y. First, note that
U¯gtgt = − [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
α (1− α) yt (yt − gt − ht) + [(1− α) yt − gt]2
g2t (yt − gt − ht)2
< 0
U¯htht =
− [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
(yt − gt − ht)2
− ωb
(ht)
2 < 0.
Then, U¯gtgtU¯htht can be written as
U¯gtgtU¯htht = [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
2
[
(1− α) ytgt − 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
+X + Y + Z,
where X,Y, and Z are positive constants. Moreover,
U¯gtht = − [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
[
(1− α) ytgt − 1
]
(yt − gt − ht)2
,
and thus
(
U¯gtht
)2 = [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]2
[
(1− α) ytgt − 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
such that
U¯gtgtU¯htht −
(
U¯gtht
)2 = X + Y + Z > 0, for any (gt, ht).

(ii) First, it is straightforward that, as in the standard AK model, there are no tran-
sitional dynamics such that the economy immediately jumps onto its steady-state
path. Moreover, note that output per worker in equilibrium is linear in the capital
stock per worker k, and thus has to grow at the same rate as k, namely at rate γ−1.
Then, output per capita at t is given by
Yt
Lt + Lt−1
=
ytLt
Lt + Lt−1
=
yt
1 + Lt−1/Lt
=
1 + n
2 + n
yt,
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and is thus proportional to output per worker and has to grow at the same rate.
Using (2.11) and (2.12), consumption per capita at t obtains as
Ct
Lt + Lt−1
=
cytLt + c
o
tLt−1
Lt + Lt−1
=
Lt
Lt + Lt−1
(
cyt +
cot
1 + n
)
=
1 + n
2 + n
1 + αβ
1 + β
(1− τ)yt,
and is also proportional to output per worker. Similar arguments apply to all other
relevant variables such as government spending and wages. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Assume that the economic environment is identical to that of the previous sections, except
in a final period T where there is a generation of newborns that lives only for one period.
The consumption of old and young households in this period are given by
cyT = (1− τT )wT = (1− α)
(
AkαT g
1−α
T − gT − hT
)
, (.5)
coT = (1− τT )RT sT−1 = α(1 + n)
(
AkαT g
1−α
T − gT − hT
)
, (.6)
respectively. The policymaker then chooses gT and hT to maximize the political objective
function UT = (1 + n)UYT + ωU
O
T = (1 + n) ln c
y
T + ω ln c
o
T + ωb lnhT . Omitting terms
independent of the policy choices gT and hT , the political objective function reduces to
UT ' (1 + n+ ω) ln
(
AkαT g
1−α
T − gT − hT
)
+ ωb lnhT . (.7)
The first-order conditions of maximizing (.7) with respect to gT and hT yield
gT = (1− α)yT and hT = ωbα1 + n+ ω (1 + b)yT , (.8)
with yT = A(1− α)1−αkT .
Now we can proceed by backward induction. In period T −1 voters choose gT−1 and hT−1,
correctly anticipating gT and hT , to maximize
UT−1 = (1 + n)UYT−1 + ωU
O
T−1
= (1 + n) ln cyT−1 + β (1 + n) [ln c
o
T + b lnhT ] + ω
[
ln coT−1 + b lnhT−1
]
with coT given by (.6), c
y
T−1 follows from (2.11) for t = T − 1 and coT−1 from (2.12) for
t = T −1. Using gT and hT of (.8) as well as kT of (2.13) for t = T −1 and omitting terms
independent of policy variables the political objective function at T − 1 can be written as
UT−1 ' [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω] ln
(
AkαT−1g
1−α
T−1 − gT−1 − hT−1
)
+ ωb lnhT−1.
(.9)
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After some algebra, the first-order conditions of maximizing (.9) with respect to gT−1 and
hT−1 yield
gT−1 = (1− α)yT−1 (.10)
and
hT−1 =
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
yT−1 = τPh yT−1, (.11)
where yT−1 = A(1 − α)1−αkT−1. The policy functions (.10) and (.11) correspond to the
equilibrium policy functions of the infinite-horizon economy (see equation 3.3). Proceeding
in the same way for all preceding periods one readily verifies that this equilibrium policy
mix results for all periods t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1
First note that the indirect utility of a young agent of generation t given by (2.14) is
additively separable in (ht, gt, kt) and (ht+1, gt+1, kt+1), i. e.,
UYt (ht, gt, kt, ht+1, gt+1, kt+1) = Pt(gt, ht, kt) +Qt+1(gt+1, ht+1, kt+1),
where
Pt(gt, ht, kt) ≡ ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
and
Qt+1(gt+1, ht+1, kt+1) ≡ β ln
(
Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1
)
+ βb lnht+1.
Then, the Ramsey planner’s objective function in (4.1) can be expressed as
max
{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
W (·) ≡ max
{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
{
βUO0 +
∞∑
t=0
((1 + n)β)t+1 UYt
}
= max
g0,h0,k1
{
βUO0 + max{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=1
∞∑
t=0
((1 + n)β)t+1 UYt
}
= max
g0,h0,k1
{
βUO0 + max
g1,h1,k2
{
(1 + n)βUY0 + max{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=2
∞∑
t=1
((1 + n)β)t+1 UYt
}}
= max
g0,h0,k1
{
βUO0 + max
g1,h1,k2
{
(1 + n)β [P0(·) +Q1(·)] + max{·}∞t=2
∞∑
t=1
((1 + n)β)t+1 UYt
}}
= max
g0,h0.k1
{
β
(
UO0 + (1 + n)P0(·)
)
+ max
{·}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
(1 + n)t βt [Qt(·) + (1 + n)βPt(·)]
}
,
(.12)
where the argument of {·} is gt, ht, kt+1.
Now let Tt (gt, ht, kt) ≡ Qt (gt, ht, kt) + (1 + n)βPt (gt, ht, kt) and note that from (2.15)
and the definition of Pt follows βUO0 + (1 + n)βP0(·) = βQ0(·) + (1 + n)βP0(·) = T0 (·)
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such that (.12) can be written as
max
{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
W (·) = max
g0,h0,k1
{
T0 (g0, h0, k0) + max{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
(1 + n)t βtTt (gt, ht, kt)
}
.
(.13)
Defining the value function
V (kt) ≡ max{gt+s,ht+s,kt+1+s}∞s=0
∞∑
s=0
(1 + n)s βsTt+s (gt+s, ht+s, kt+s) ,
standard recursion on (.13) yields the functional Bellman equation (4.2). 
Proof of Proposition 2
In order to solve the Ramsey problem, we start by guessing that the solution to the
functional equation (4.2) takes the form of V (k) = a0 + a1 ln k for all k, where a0 and a1
are yet undetermined coefficients. Then, the Bellman equation becomes
a0 + a1 ln kt = max{gt,ht,kt+1} {(2 + n)β ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ βb lnht
+(1 + n)βa0 + (1 + n)βa1 ln kt+1}
subject to (2.13). Substituting for kt+1, the Bellman equation reduces to
a0 + a1 ln kt = max{gt,ht} {β (1 + (1 + n) (1 + a1)) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+βb lnht + (1 + n)βa0 + (1 + n)βa1 ln B˜}. (.14)
After some algebra, the first-order conditions with respect to gt and ht yield
gt = (1− α)yt and ht = bα1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)yt, (.15)
with yt = A1/α(1 − α)(1−α)/α. Using this in (.14) and collecting the terms that multiply
ln kt results in
a0 + a1 ln kt = β (1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)) ln kt + (1 + n)βa0 + (1 + n)βa1 ln B˜
+β (1 + (1 + n) (1 + a1)) ln
[
1 + (1 + n) (1 + a1)
1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)
αA
1
α (1− α) 1−αα
]
+βb ln
[
bα
(1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1))
A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα
]
.
The functional equation holds for all k if and only if a1 = β (1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)).
This in turn implies that
a1 =
β (2 + b+ n)
1− β(1 + n)
is required for a solution. This expression can then be used to solve for a0. Thus, it
has been verified that the tentative guess is indeed a solution to the functional equation.
Substitution of a1 in (.15) then yields τRh of Proposition 2. 
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Proof of Corollary 2
The result follows directly from comparing τRh of Proposition 2 to τ
P
h of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Corollary 3
1. From Proposition 1 we have
τPh =
αωb
(1 + n) [1 + β (1 + b)] + ω (1 + b)
. (.16)
Partial derivation of (.16) with respect to n immediately yields dτPh /dn < 0. More-
over, τg = 1− α such that dτg/dn = 0. The comparative static result for τ immedi-
ately follows from the definition of τ and from the first two results.
2. Using (.16) in (3.5) yields the equilibrium growth rate as
γ = αB
[1 + β (1 + b)] + ω/ (1 + n)
(1 + n) [1 + β (1 + b)] + ω (1 + b)
.
Then, partial derivation immediately yields dγ/dn < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3
In the presence of a perfect annuity market, an individual born at t chooses the plan
(cyt , c
o
t+1, st) to maximize her lifetime utility (2.1) subject to c
y
t + st = (1 − τt)wt and
cot+1 = st(1 − τt+1)Rt+1/v. Writing the problem like this uses the fact that the assets
at t + 1 of a member of generation t are equal to st + (1 − v)st/v = st/v. Moreover,
it incorporates the results of Yaari (1965) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) according
to which individuals without a bequest motive want to annuitize all their wealth. The
optimal choices of a member of cohort t are given by (2.5), (2.7), and
cot+1 = β(1 − τt)wt(1 − τt+1)Rt+1/v(1 + β) with β ≡ βvv. Then, one readily verifies that
all other equations in Sections 2 and 3 remain valid.30
As an increase in the survival probability v raises the effective discount factor β, equation
(2.7) yields ∂st/∂v > 0. Thus, for a given government policy, an increase in v raises
savings per worker. This, in turn has a positive effect on the growth rate of capital per
worker, see equation (3.5). However, we assume that the increase in life expectancy is
unexpected for generation 1 such that it makes its plan (cy1, s1, c
o
2) without anticipating
the increase of the survival probability from v to vˆ. Hence, the positive growth effect only
materializes from generation 2 onwards.
30The only exception is equation (2.12) that modifies to cot = α(1 + n)
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
/v.
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The second effect of an increase in life expectancy is that the effective weight of the old,
ω = ωvv, in the political objective function (3.1) increases. However, this effect only
becomes effective from period 2 onwards too. In period t = 1, the young of generation 1
and the old of generation 0, whose size is determined by the initial life expectancy v, vote
on government policy. Thus, in t = 1 government policy is unaffected by an increase in
the survival probability. This in turn implies that the accumulation rule that determines
the capital stock per worker in period 2 is unchanged. Thus, τˆPh1 and γˆ2 correspond to τ
P
h
and γ of Proposition 1 with ω = ωvv.
By contrast, from period 2 onwards the relevant effective discount factor and the effective
political weight are βˆ ≡ βvvˆ and ωˆ ≡ ωvvˆ. Then, the politico-economic equilibrium for
any t = 2, 3, ...,∞ is characterized by
τˆgt = 1− α ≡ τˆg, (.17)
τˆPht =
αωvvˆb
(1 + n) [1 + vˆβv (1 + b)] + ωvvˆ (1 + b)
≡ τˆPh , (.18)
γˆt+1 =
βvvˆ
1 + βvvˆ
(
α− τˆPh
)
X ≡ γˆ (.19)
where X ≡ A1/α (1− α)1/α / (1 + n) .
Partial derivation of (.18) with respect to vˆ gives
dτˆPh
dvˆ
=
αωvb [(1 + n) (1 + vˆβv (1 + b)) + ωvvˆ (1 + b)− (1 + n) vˆβv (1 + b)− ωvvˆ (1 + b)]
[(1 + n) [1 + vˆβv (1 + b)] + ωvvˆ (1 + b)]
2
=
αωvb (1 + n)[
(1 + n)
[
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
]
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2 > 0. (.20)
Moreover,
∂γˆ
∂vˆ
=
βv(
1 + βˆ
)2 (α− τˆPh )X − βˆ1 + βˆ dτˆ
P
h
dvˆ
X =
Xβv
1 + βˆ
(
−vˆ dτˆ
P
h
dvˆ
+
α− τˆPh
1 + βˆ
)
.
(.21)
Using (.20) in (.21) and rearranging yields
∂γˆ
∂vˆ
=
Xβvα
1 + βˆ
(1 + n)2
(
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
)2
+ ωˆ2 (1 + b) + ωˆ (1 + n)
(
2
(
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
)
+ βˆb2
)
[
(1 + n)
(
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
)
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2
> 0.
Thus, τˆPh > τ
P
h and γˆ > γ for all t = 2, 3, ...,∞. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting (6.4) and (6.5) in the political objective function (3.1) yields the program to
be solved by the political mechanism as max{τcg ,τch} U¯t with
U¯t = [(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω] ln
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
+ [(1 + n)β + ω] b ln τ ch
+ [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)] (1− α)/α ln τ cg .
The first-order conditions of the above program with respect to τ cg and τ
c
h yield
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω
1− τ cg − τ ch
=
(1− α) [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]
ατ cg
(.22)
and
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω
1− τ cg − τ ch
=
(1 + n)βb+ ωb
τ ch
. (.23)
Combining (.22) and (.23) yields
τ cg =
(1− α) [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]
[(1 + n)β + ω]αb
τ ch. (.24)
Substituting (.24) in (.23) and solving for τ ch yields
τ ch =
((1 + n)β + ω)αb
(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
< α,
which is τ ch of (6.6). Finally, using (6.6) in (.24) yields τ
c
g = 1− α.
The policy mix of (6.6) is the global maximizer of the political objective function. To see
this note that
U¯τcg τcg = −
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)2
−(1− α) [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]
α
(
τ cg
)2 < 0
U¯τchτ
c
h
= −(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)2 − [(1 + n)β + ω] b(
τ ch
)2 < 0
(
U¯τcg τch
)2
=
[(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω]2(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)4
U¯τcg τcg U¯τchτ
c
h
=
[(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω]2(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)4 +X + Y + Z,
where X,Y, and Z are positive constants. Then,
U¯τcg τcg U¯τchτ
c
h
−
(
U¯τcg τch
)2
= X + Y + Z > 0, for any (τ cg , τ
c
h).

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Proof of Corollary 4
Proof by contradiction. Suppose that τ ch ≤ τPh , then
((1 + n)β + ω)αb
(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
≤ αbω
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
⇔ [(1 + n)β + ω] (1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + (1 + n)βω (1 + b)
≤ (1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b))ω
⇔ (1 + n) [−β (1 + b)ω + (1 + n)β (1 + β (1 + b)) + βω (1 + b)] ≤ 0
⇔ (1 + n)β (1 + β (1 + b)) ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus, it has to hold that τ ch > τ
P
h .

Proof of Corollary 5
1. Comparative statics for a change in n
Partial derivation of each of the expenditures shares of (6.6) with respect to n yields
∂τ cg
∂n
= 0
∂τ ch
∂n
=
−αbω [1 + β (1 + b)]
[(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]2
< 0.
Using τ ch in (6.7) we obtain the equilibrium growth factor as
γc = αB
[1 + β (2 + b)] + ω/ (1 + n)
(1 + n) [1 + 2β (1 + b)] + ω (1 + b)
.
Then, partial derivation immediately yields dγc/dn < 0.
2. Comparative statics for an increase in life expectancy
Consider the reinterpretation of the economic framework as described in Section 5.2.
Then, τ ch and γ
c can be rewritten as
τ ch =
((1 + n)βv + ωv)αb
(1 + n) (1/v + 2βv (1 + b)) + ωv (1 + b)
and
γc =
βvvX
1 + βv
(α− τ ch) ,
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where X ≡ A1/α (1− α)1/α / (1 + n) . Then, a permanent increase in the survival
probability v has the following effects on government policy and economic growth:
∂τ cg
∂v
= 0
∂τ ch
∂v
> 0
∂γc
∂v
= αβvX
βv(1 + n)2
[
(2 + b)(1 + 2v) + (1 + b)(3 + b)ω + 2β(1 + b)2
]
(1 + βˆ)2
[
1+n
v + 2βv(1 + n)(1 + b) + ω(1 + b)
]2
+
(1 + n)
[
2ωv/v + βvωv + (1 + n)/v2
]
+ (1 + b)ω2v
(1 + βˆ)2
[
1+n
v + 2βv(1 + n)(1 + b) + ωv(1 + b)
]2 > 0.
However, as the increase in the life expectancy is unexpected these effects only
materialize with a period delay; for an intuition see the proof of Proposition 3.

Proof of Proposition 5
Substituting (6.8) and (6.9) in the political objective function (3.1) yields the program to
be solved by the political mechanism as
max
{gt,ht}
U¯ with U¯ ≡ [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω] ln (Akαt g1−αt − gt − ht)+ ωb lnht.
The first-order conditions of the above program with respect to gt and ht are
U¯gt =
(1− α) yt − gt
gt (yt − gt − ht) [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω] = 0
U¯ht = −
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω
yt − gt − ht +
ωb
ht
= 0.
The first condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1 − α)yt. Using this in the second
condition and rearranging immediately yields τmh of (6.11).
The policy mix of Proposition 5 is the global maximizer of the political objective function.
To see this note that
U¯gtgt = − [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
α (1− α) yt (yt − gt − ht) + [(1− α) yt − gt]2
g2t (yt − gt − ht)2
< 0
U¯htht =
− [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
(yt − gt − ht)2
− ωb
(ht)
2 < 0.
Then, U¯gtgtU¯htht can be written as
U¯gtgtU¯htht = [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
2
[
(1− α) ytgt − 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
+X + Y + Z,
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where X,Y, and Z are positive constants. Moreover,
U¯gtht = − [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
[
(1− α) ytgt − 1
]
(yt − gt − ht)2
,
and thus
(
U¯gtht
)2 = [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]2
[
(1− α) ytgt − 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
such that
U¯gtgtU¯htht −
(
U¯gtht
)2 = X + Y + Z > 0, for any (gt, ht).

Proof of Corollary 6
Proof by contradiction. Suppose that τmh ≤ τPh , then
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω (1 + b)
≤ αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
⇔ 1 + b ≤ α,
which is a contradiction. Thus, it has to hold that τmh > τ
P
h .

Proof of Corollary 7
1. Comparative statics for a change in n
Partial derivation of (6.11) with respect to n immediately yields dτmh /dn < 0. More-
over, d(gt/yt)/dn = 0. Then, using (6.11) in (6.12) we obtain the equilibrium growth
factor as
γm = αB
(1 + αβ) + ω/ (1 + n)
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω (1 + b)
.
Then, partial derivation immediately yields dγm/dn < 0.
2. Comparative statics for an increase in life expectancy
Consider the reinterpretation of the economic framework as described in Section 5.2.
Then, τmh and γ
m can be rewritten as
τmh =
αωvb
(1 + n) (1/v + αβv) + ωv (1 + b)
and
γm =
βvvX
1 + βv
(α− τmh ) ,
43
where X ≡ A1/α (1− α)1/α / (1 + n) . Then, a permanent increase in the survival
probability v has the following effects on government policy and economic growth:
∂(gt/yt)
∂v
= 0
∂τmh
∂v
> 0
∂γm
∂v
=
βvX
1 + βˆ
(
−v∂τ
m
h
∂v
+ α− τmh
)
=
Xβvα
1 + βˆ
(1 + n)
(
1 + αβˆ
)(
(1 + n)(1 + αβˆ) + ωˆ
)
[
(1 + n)
(
1 + αβˆ
)
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2
+
Xβvαωˆ
1 + βˆ
(1 + b)ωˆ + (1 + n)
(
1 + (1 + b)αβˆ
)
[
(1 + n)
(
1 + αβˆ
)
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2 > 0.
However, as the increase in the life expectancy is unexpected these effects only
materialize with a period delay; for an intuition see the proof of Proposition 3.

Existence proof for numerical example of Section 6.2.2
To see that a unique τPH exists if ρ is sufficiently small, rewrite equation (6.28) as
(1 + n) (1 + β) + ω = α−ρb
[
ω
(
τPh
)ρ−1 (
α− τPh
)1−ρ − (1 + n) (1 + β) (τPh )ρ (α− τPh )−ρ].
(.25)
Denote the right-hand side of (.25) by RHS(τPh , ρ) and the left-hand side, which does not
depend on τh, by LHS. One readily verifies that ∂RHS(τPh , ρ)/∂τh < 0 for any ρ < 1.
Moreover, for a given ρ, RHS(τPh , ρ) > 0 when τ
P
h is sufficiently small (i. e. close to zero)
and RHS(τPh , ρ) < 0 when τ
P
h is sufficiently close to α. Therefore, there is a unique value
of τPh ∈ (0, α) which satisfies (.25) if and only if RHS(τPh , ρ) for τPh close to zero is greater
than LHS. Now note that for a given τPh
∂RHS(τPh , ρ)
∂ρ
=
b
(
τPh
)ρ−1
αρ
(
α− τPh
)ρ ln
((
α− τPh
)
α
τPh
)(
τPh (1 + β) (1 + n)− ω
(
α− τPh
))
.
Thus, limτPh →0
(
∂RHS(τPh , ρ)/∂ρ
)
< 0 and limτPh →0RHS(τ
P
h , ρ) is greater the smaller ρ.
Therefore, we can conclude that a solution to (.25) only exists if ρ is not too large.

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